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The near sea of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in this paper is conceptualized as 
the vast sea areas between China’s coastline and the first island chain. It includes Bohai, the 
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. Each of the five 
sea area has had long history but different nature of disputes, different countries and their 
interests have been involved, different compositions and levels in the balance of naval and air 
forces, and different characteristics of possible contingencies. 
 
The Bohai is considered a Chinese inner lake and the gateway to the political-military 
center of gravity. The Yellow Sea has a direct linkage between China and the Korean 
Peninsula which has long being regarded as lip and teeth relationship. The East China Sea 
between China and Japanese archipelagos touches the nerves of the long historical rivalries 
between the two East Asian giants and connects to the parameter of U.S.-Japan security 
alliance. The Taiwan Strait has been a demarcation zone that divided the two ethnic Chinese 
nations, but in recent decades, a pathway of flourishing bilateral trade activities. The South 
China Sea has been not only a battleground for surrounding states in the contests of 
sovereignty and resources, but also one of the major passages of global maritime trade. 
 
The above mentioned five segments of sea areas, or the PRC’s near sea, are distinctive 
contingencies in diplomatic, economic and security terms; but to the Chinese, the near sea 
areas are with common fundamentals, i.e. the inherited historical concept of “haifang” or 
“maritime defense” in national defense deliberation, the origin of more than 170 years of 
historical humiliation inflicted by foreign maritime powers, and most of all, China’s claim of 
sovereign waters.  
 
Today, with China’s rapid growing maritime trade and military capabilities, the near sea 
becomes the venue toward both prosperity and potential conflict, and the area that Chinese 
military maritime power may pivot from purely defensive nature to both defensive and 
offensive capabilities. 
 
China’s Near Sea Contingencies 
 
 Due to its relatively weak military capabilities, in the past century, China’s 
maritime contingencies had been entirely limited to the near sea areas. By strict definition, in 
its warfighting history, the PLA Navy has never engaged in a war with any modern Western 
navy. Until the end of 20th century, the PLA Navy had encountered only two navies – Taiwan 
and Vietnam, both small and weak. In geographic terms, the PLA Navy’s warfighting was 
conducted primarily in two geographic contingencies. From 1949 to 1965, the Chinese Navy 
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engaged in battles only with Taiwan (naval) forces in gaining control of several dozens 
offshore islands located along the coast of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangzhou. From 1974 to 
1988, the PLA Navy engaged in several sporadic, small-scale skirmishes with the Vietnamese 
naval forces in the Paracels and the Spratlys in the South China Sea. The PLA Navy has, 
therefore, not been forced into a large-scale battle at sea with any strong maritime power.1  
 
The near sea contingencies, in the past, involved primarily China’s sense of defending 
its coastlines and maritime sovereignty claims. After 30 years of economic reform and 
opening up to the outside world, China’s maritime interests have been widely expanded 
alongside with its growing international influence, the rapid economic growth and military 
modernization. Even though China has its interests around the globe, maritime contingencies 
that may pose direct threats and impacts on China’s national security remains in the near sea 
areas. By reviewing events and incidents China encountered in recent years, we can identify 
five types of near sea contingencies today. 
 
 Encounter with foreign naval and air forces 
With the large increase of China’s defense expenditures and improved force 
projection capability, China’s PLA forces has been flown and sailed further away from 
its coasts to conduct training and exercises and naturally increased the probabilities of 
contacts, especially those unplanned, unexpected, or even unfriendly encounters, with 
foreign forces operating in the China seas.  
 
A contact of PLA Navy’s Han-class submarine with U.S. Navy’s Kitty Hawk 
aircraft carrier battle group in the Yellow sea area in October 1994, and the crash of U.S. 
EP-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft with the PLA Naval Air Force J-8II fighter near 
the South China Sea have been tow of many cases of this kind. 
 
 Freedom of navigation and Chinese EEZ 
Different understanding and interpretations of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have led to quarrels between China and the U.S. on 
whether the U.S. ocean surveillance ships have the rights to conduct operations within 
China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as defined by the UNCLOS. Those ocean 
surveillance ships, with low frequency active sonar systems onboard, operating near 
China’s waters of course raised suspicions and anxieties of China worrying for the 
military-sensitive intelligence collections.  
                                                      
1
 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999:From Coastal Defense to Distant Operations,” 
in Mark Ryan and Michael A. McDevitt, eds.,  Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003, PP. XX-XX. 
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The most notable case was the incident involving USNS Impeccable in March 2009 
when Chinese PLA Navy ships and airplanes, law enforcement agencies’ vessels and 
some fishing boats tried in consecutive days to chase the Impeccable away from waters 
of China’s EEZ.2 
 
 Maritime resources competition 
Potential energy and mineral resources under seabed in the vast areas of China’s 
seas have been major causes for maritime disputes in the region. Except for the 
territorial sea and adjacent area, neighboring countries have had engaged fierce 
competition in claiming islands and isles, defining the demarcation of EEZ lines, 
attracting foreign energy companies for exploitation.  
 
China has had disputes in numerous sea areas with its neighbors, especially with 
Japan over the Chunxiao Gas Field in the area of claimed overlapping EEZs, and with 
Vietnam over several offshore blocks open for bidding by foreign companies. 
 
 Disputing maritime claims 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has engaged in negotiations with countries 
sharing land borders and has been able to settle most of the borderline demarcation and 
resolved land border disputes. In the case of maritime, however, overlapping claims over 
islands and waters are far from resolved but cause sporadic conflicts among claimants. 
 
 Disasters and crime at sea 
Natural-caused and human-made disasters at sea have been getting more attentions. 
Ship collisions, oil spills, piracy, severe weather-caused and many other natural disasters 
have raised awareness of sea-going countries. As China’s international profile rises, 
either by demonstrating its big power responsibility or by that fact that itself has the 
need, China in recent years has had actively involved in humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises in the near sea areas by itself and with neighbors. 
Between 2002 and 2012, China has participated in 54 non-traditional security joint 
exercises with foreign countries, including 22 joint HA/DR exercises with foreign navies 
at sea though most of them were conducted as part of the PLA Navy’s port call visits to 
other countries beyond the near sea areas.3 
 
Maritime Sovereignty Dispute: Diaoyutai Ship Collision, 2010  
                                                      
2
 Footnote to be added. 
3
 Tang Cheng, “PLA & Foreign Military Joint Exercise: non-traditional security cooperation,” Chinese 
Communist Studies (zhonggong Yan jiu 中共研究), Vol. 45, No. 7, July 2011, p. 85. More footnote to be added.  
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 Primary period: September 7 – September 24 
 
 Parties directly involved: Japan Coast Guard ships vs. Chinese Fishing boat 
 
 Key Development:  
Japanese Coast Guard ship Mizuki, on September 7, 2010, encountered a Chinese 
fishing boat Minjinyu 5179 and found it sailed 7.5 miles northwest of the disputed 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, and was outside the agreed area for Chinese fishing, and 
within undisputed Japanese territorial waters. The Chinese fishing boat defied the order 
by Japanese Coast Guard ship to stop and receive inspection, and attempted to flee from 
the scene. During the chase and interception, Minjinyu 5179 collided with JCG's ships. On 
September 8, 2010, JCG boarded the Chinese trawler and arrested its captain Zhan 
Qixiong for obstruction of performance of public duty and illegal fishing. The trawler, the 
captain, and 14 crew members, were transported to Ishigaki Island of Japan for detention.  
In response to the arrest, the Chinese government made a series of diplomatic 
protests, demanding the immediate release of the trawler and all its crew. China 
summoned Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China in Beijing, six times. The 
trawler and 14 of the crew members (but not the captain, Zhan) were released after the 
sixth summons on September 13, 2010. The captain of the trawler remained in Japanese 
detention and was finally released on September 24, 2010.4 
 
 PLA Activities: No immediate response or direct engagement 
In this high profile and widely watched episode, there was little room for China to 
react militarily. However, there were a series of naval exercises conducted by the PLA 
Navy’s North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet during and immediately after the dispute 
that may have put certain pressure on Japan, assisting China’s strong diplomatic protest. 
Events in the exercises included ship maneuver, shipboard missile firing, and combined 
arms training involving naval air force. The noteworthy one was an “island assault” 
exercise conducted by the East Sea Fleet on September 29, practicing various types of 
ships for amphibious landing operations.5 
 
Maritime Sovereignty Dispute: Scarborough Shoal Standoff, 2012 
 
 Primary period: April 10 – late June 
                                                      
4
 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Senkaku_boat_collision_incident  
5
 Chinese Communist Yearbook 2011 (Zhonggong Nianbao 中共年報), PP. 3-110 – 3-112. 
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 Parties directly involved: Philippine Navy ships vs. Chinese fishing boats and Chinese 
Maritime Surveillance ships 
 
 Key Development:  
 On April 8, 2012, A Philippine Navy surveillance plane spotted eight Chinese 
fishing vessels docked at the waters of Scarborough shoal. The Philippine Navy frigate 
BRP Gregorio del Pilar (former USCGC Hamilton) on the same day was sent to survey 
the vicinity of the shoal, confirmed the presence of the fishing vessels and monitored the 
activity of these vessels. On April 10, 2012, BRP Gregorio del Pilar came to inspect the 
catch of the fishing vessels. The inspection team discovered illegally 
collected corals, giant clams and live sharks inside the first vessel boarded by the 
team. BRP Gregorio del Pilar reported that they attempted to arrest the Chinese 
fishermen but were blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships, China Marine 
Surveillance 75 (Zhongguo Haijian 75) and China Marine Surveillance 84 (Zhongguo 
Haijian 84) happened to cruse in nearby waters. Since then, tensions continue for 
several months between the two countries. 
 
 PLA Activities: No immediate response or direct engagement 
Along the course of dispute events in the relative long standoff, China mostly relied 
on its maritime law enforcement ships. However, according to Japanese source, it was 
reported that, on May 2, PLA sent a large formation of combatants southward without 
clear destination. The flotilla included The five warships are said to include: two type 
052B destroyers, Guangzhou (168) and Wuhan (169); two escort vessels, Yulin (569) and 
Chaohu (568); and a type 071 landing ship, Kunlunshan (998).6 
 
Maritime Sovereignty Dispute: Japan’s Nationalization of Dioayutai, 2012 
 
 Primary period: April 16 – September 11 
 
 Parties directly involved: Japanese Coast Guard ships, Chinese maritime law 
enforcement ships, Hong Kong fishing boats, and Taiwan fishing boats and escorting 
                                                      
6
 “China sends five warships to the disputed Scarborough Shoal” What’s on Shenzhen, May 10, 2012. 
http://www.whatsonshenzhen.com/news-2423-china-sends-five-warships-to-the-disputed-scarborough-shoal.ht
ml  
Phoenix TV Network citing source from Japan’s Ministry of Defense; see 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%B8%94%E6%94%BF%E8%88%B9%E4%B
8%8E%E8%8F%B2%E5%BE%8B%E5%AE%BE%E6%8A%A4%E5%8D%AB%E8%88%B0%E5%AF%B9
%E5%B3%99%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6#.E4.BA.8B.E4.BB.B6.E7.BB.8F.E8.BF.87  
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Coast Guard ships. 
 
 Key Development:  
The most recent dispute on sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were 
ignited by a speech at Heritage Foundation in Washington DC on April 16, 2012, given 
by then Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, a right wing politician advocating a more 
proactive role of Japan in international affairs and being tough on China. Audience, 
especially those in China and Taiwan, was sharply surprised when Governor Ishihara 
announced his intention to buy the three islands in the East China Sea from Japanese 
landowners in his speech.7 
 
With an intension to prevent escalation and a way to curtail Ishihara’s political 
maneuver, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda initiated a process of 
nationalization, i.e. purchase the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands by the central government. 
Citizens across China, Taiwan and Hong Kong organized different scales of public 
protests; some activists lease fishing boats to land on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku and got 
arrested (but soon released) by the Japanese Coast Guard; Taiwan’s Yilan County 
Fisherman Union orchestrated massive boat formation to protest Japan’s infringement of 
their fishing rights near the Diaoyutai/Senkaku.8 
 
The Japanese government signed a ¥2.05 billion contract on September 11, 2012, 
with the so-called owner of three of the five Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in the East 
China Sea, effectively nationalizing the territory, it immediately drawing a strong protest 
from Beijing, which sent surveillance ships to the area.9 The dispute was continues. 
 
 PLA Activities: No immediate response or direct engagement 
In addition to strong diplomatic protests, China showed its strength basically 
through sending maritime law enforcement ships to the vicinity of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku area and there has been no evidence that PLA was employed to 
handle the situation. However, according to Japan’s Joint Staff Office, between April and 
September in 2012, the Chinese military aircraft had flown near Japan’s air defense 
                                                      
7
 “Ishihara thumbs his nose at the central government,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 18, 2012, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201204180054  
8
 Footnote to be added. 
9
 “China enraged, sends ships: ¥2 billion deal nationalizes the Senkakus,” The Japan Times, September 12, 
2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120912a1.html  
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identification zone 69 times, 54 among them were in the period between July and 
September when the “nationalization of Senkaku” issue was heavily quarreled between 
the claimants.10 
 
In addition to the events in the air, the PLA Navy has also conducted four distant 
water cruising exercises, though maybe routine, passing through the Japan archipelagos 
into the Pacific,11 they did send strong messages to Tokyo when the dispute was 
heightened. 
 
2012/4/30 430 km west of 
Yakushima Island 
2 JIangkai-II FFG 
1 Intelligence-gathering ship 
After 
exercise 
with 
Russia 
2012/5/8 650 km south of 
Okinawa 
2 Luyang-I DDG 
2 Jiangkai-II FFG 
1 Type-071LSD 
 
2012/5/14 110 km NE of 
Miyako Island 
2 JIangkai-II FFG 
1 Intelligence-gathering ship 
Same to 
2012/4/30 
2012/11/28 Near Miyako 
Island 
2 DDGs Hangzhou & Ningbo 
2 FFGs Zhoushan & Maanshan 
1 AOR Boyanghu  
Same to 
2012/4/30 
 
Furthermore, on September 23, 2012, China’s State Oceanic Administration 
announced that it has approved a pilot program of using drones to undertake 
remote-sensing marine surveillance in Lianyungang, a costal city in eastern Jiangsu 
Province. With the experience learned from the pilot program, the SOA would try to form 
a managerial system and technical regulations in a bid to set up UAV surveillance and 
monitoring bases in provinces along China's coastline by 2015. In addition, the SOA 
would step up efforts to enhance its surveillance of the islands and islets including the 
Diaoyu Islands and Huangyan (Scarborough) Island.12 
Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies  
                                                      
10
 Japan News Networks, http://www.ribenxinwen.com/html/g/201210/19-14526.html (can be further verified) 
11
 Various sources, to be added. 
12
 “China to promote drones for marine surveillance,” Xinhua News, September 23, 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/23/c_123750476.htm 
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 During the 2004-2005 disputes over the Cunxiao gas field with Japan in the East China 
Sea, China sent PLA Navy ships to the area, about 290 nm Northwest of Kume Island, 
Okinawa Prefecture.[3] The group consisted of a the new SOVREMENNIY class destroyer 
No. 137, two older JIANGHU class frigates, the new replenishment ship No. 886 and a new 
electronic/signals intelligence and space tracking ship No. 851.13 Japan sent only its Coast 
Guard ships. 
 
 That was the last time China used naval assets to deal with maritime territorial disputes. 
Since then, maritime law enforcement agencies began to take the driver’s seat and serve as 
the first-response front-line units in all sovereignty related events and areas. It was believed 
that China realized the use of non-military vessels can be tenable in the international public 
opinion, and at the same time can avoid escalation of such conflict. Thus, the PLA Navy has 
been kept away from the frontline in managing maritime territorial disputes, and is 
considered as the last resort. 
 
 The PRC has five major maritime law enforcement agencies, used to be referred to as 
“five dragons in the sea” (wulong chuhai 五龍出海). Unlike the system in the United Sates, 
China’s does not have a unified institution to oversee and implement maritime affairs and law 
enforcement. The five agencies are under different ministries with diverse and complicated 
chain of commands, funding resources, areas of responsibility, and personnel systems. 
  
Agency Ministry/Department Primary Missions/Ships 
Marine Surveillance 
(zhongguo haijian 
中國海監) 
State Oceanic 
Administration 
Law enforcement within the PRC's 
territorial waters, exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ), and 
shores. 
Protecting the maritime 
environment, natural resources, 
navigation aids and other facilities, 
and can carry out maritime 
surveys. 
Ship name: Haijian (海監) 
1000 tons: 27 
                                                      
13
 Richard Fisher, “Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval Balance,” International Assessment and 
Strategy Center, November 22, 2005, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/pub_detail.asp 
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Total: 280 
Maritime Safety 
Administration 
(zhongguo haishiju中
國海事局) 
Ministry of 
Transportation 
Coordinates maritime search and 
rescue in the territorial waters 
Ship name: Haishi (海事) or 
Haixun (海巡) 
1000 tons: 8 
Total: 800 
Fisheries Law 
Enforcement 
Command 
(zhongguo yuzheng
中國漁政) 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Management 
Administration 
Law enforcement concerning 
fishing and maritime resources in 
PRC territorial waters and 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ). 
Protecting Chinese fishing vessels 
and personnel, resolving disputes 
in fishing activities, preventing 
illegal fishing, and protecting 
maritime resources 
Ship name: Yuzheng (漁政) 
1000 tons: 3 
Total: 140 
China Coast Guard 
(zhongguo haijing 中
國海警) 
 
Ministry of Public 
Security 
People’s Armed 
Police 
Maritime Paramilitary Police 
Ship name: Haijing (海警) 
1000 tons: 3 
Total: 250 
Customs 
(zhongguo haiguan 
中國海關) 
General 
Administration of 
Customs 
Maritime anti-smuggling 
Ship name: Haiguan (海關) 
Source: Gao Zhiguo, et al., eds., “China’s Maritime Law Enforcement,” China Maritime 
Development Report (2010), Beijing: Ocean Press, pp.441-456. Also National Institute for 
Defense Studies, China Security Strategy Report (2012), Japan Ministry of Defense. 
 
 Among the five non-military maritime law enforcement agencies, the Marine 
Surveillance and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command are the two primary units 
designated to the management of China’s maritime sovereignty disputes – or the peacetime 
contingencies in the near sea. 
 
Assessment of the operational doctrines and tactics of China’s maritime law 
enforcement agencies, their the professional education, training, promotion, and logistics, as 
well as their operating sequence, duration, shifts and operational coordination, all require 
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numerous sets of studies with more open sources available, before one can assess their 
capacity and prospects. 
 
Naval Strategy Based on Near Sea Contingencies 
 
 Maritime sovereignty disputes, as stated in the beginning of the paper, are not China’s 
only contingencies in the near sea area. Even though sitting in the back seat, the PLA’s 
fundamental roles and missions cannot be forgotten, and its growing warfighting and force 
projection capabilities cannot be overlooked. 
 
 In contemplation of China’s potential near sea contingencies today, one would be 
appreciate to review on what bases the PLA naval strategy was formulated back in 1985, and 
how true the functions and applications of such strategy remain sound. 
 
The PLA Navy’s modern strategy was formulated under the leadership of Admiral Liu 
Huaqing during his tenure as commander. The PLA Navy’s strategic concept of “active 
defense, offshore operations” (jiji fangyu, jinhai zuozhan積極防禦, 近海作戰) was first 
incepted in his speech, entitled “On Several Issues Related to the Navy’s Implementation of 
the Strategic Guideline of Active Defense” (guanyu haijun guanche jiji fangyu zhanlue 
fangzhen de jige wenti關於海軍貫徹積極防禦戰略方針的幾個問題), at a senior executive 
course (gaoji ganbu junshi yanjiuban高級幹部軍事研究班) around October 1983.14 
Through a series of consultations with his own staff and with the General Staff Department, 
he formally rolled out the new naval strategy of “offshore defense” (jinhai fangyu近海防禦) 
at a PLA Navy table-top exercise on December 20, 1985.15 
 
 According to Liu Huaqing, the form (leixing類型) PLA’s naval strategy is “area defense 
[or area offense]” (quyu fangyu [huo quyu jingong]區域防禦[或區域進攻]), neither “costal 
defense” (jinan fangyu近岸防禦), nor “distant ocean offense” (yuanyang jinggong遠洋進
攻). In other words, the strategy was designed for near sea contingencies. When we try to 
understand the Chinese military thinking and actions in recent maritime disputes in the near 
sea areas, it would be interesting to review some key contents (neirong 內容) of the strategy 
revealed 27 years ago.16 
 
 Strategic Objectives (zhanlue mudi戰略目的) 
 To safeguard national unification and territorial integrity. 
                                                      
14
 Liu Huaqing, Memoir of Liu Huaqing (Liu Huaqing Huiyilu), Beijing: PLA Publisher (jiefangjun 
chunbanshe), 2004, p. 434. 
15
 Memoir of Liu Huaqing, p. 435. 
16
 Memoir of Liu Huaqing, pp. 437-438. 
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 To fight local war at sea (haishang jubu zhanzheng海上局部戰爭). 
 To deter and defend invasion from the sea by imperialists and hegemonies. 
 To maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 Strategic Missions (zhanlue renwu戰略任務) 
 Peacetime Missions 
 Realize and safeguard national unification including Taiwan. 
 Serve the purpose of China’s foreign policy. 
 Deter invasion from the sea by potential enemies. 
 Conduct potential local war at sea. 
 Support the State’s socialist construction. 
 Wartime Missions 
 Conduct operations independently or coordinately with the Army and the Air 
Force. 
 Protect China’s own sea lanes of communication. 
 Participate in strategic nuclear counterstrike under the high command. 
 Sea area of Operations (zuozhan haiqu作戰海區)17 
 From today18 to a relatively long period: the first island chain, its peripheral, and 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea areas within the island 
chain.  
 The extension of the area of operations from “coastal defense” to “offshore 
defense” would favor China in terms of conducting defense operations at sea 
(haishang fangyu zuozhan海上防禦作戰) in the “main operational directions” 
(zhuyao zuozhan fangxiang主要作戰方向). 
 In the future, with stronger economy and level of technology: Gradually extend to 
the north Pacific and the second island chain. 
 
From the promulgation of PLA Navy’s “offshore active defense strategy” to the 
maritime disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea today, one could conclude 
that objectives, missions, and especially the areas of operations are largely the same – for 
near sea contingencies. 
 
Advancement of operational doctrines 
  
The PLA Navy has been a beneficiary of China’s military doctrinal changes. To fight and to 
win a local war under high-tech and informationized conditions, the PLA Navy was given 
higher priorities in resources and procurements in order to fulfill its increasingly expanded 
                                                      
17
 The term “sea area of operations” here can be understood as the concept of “area of responsibilities” (AOR) 
in the West. 
18
 The timeframe here is believed to mean the time around mid-1980s. 
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missions. Under the PLA’s overall military strategic guidelines, for more than a decade, the 
PLA Navy has engaged massive efforts to adapt to new security environments and 
requirements, and to develop new operational concepts as part of doctrinal enrichment and 
refinement. 
 
1. Primacy of Technology 
The PLA Navy, since the new military strategic guidelines was promulgated, has 
emphasized to fight and win a local war at sea under modern, and especially under 
high-tech conditions.19 In the new century, informationization has been identified as the 
core of modern naval warfare theory.20 Parallel to the emphasis of “strengthening the 
army with science and technology” (keji qianghjun科技強軍), the PLA Navy has 
advocated the importance of developing technologies and capabilities in electronic, 
electro-magnetic, and precision munitions, advanced command, control, surveillance 
and reconnaissance, all of which aiming at new capabilities for future naval operations 
far away from the Chinese coast.  
 
2. Advocacy of Offensive 
The PLA Navy continues to identify its strategy is defensive in nature, but at the 
campaign level, many have advocated that offensive operations are necessary at the 
campaign level and battle level.21 To fight a joint campaign at sea under 
informationized conditions, one PLA writer argues that the PLA Navy should establish a 
operational doctrine of “integration of offensive and defensive, but with offensive as the 
focus” (gongfangjiehe, yigongweizhu攻防結合, 以攻為主), insisting that initiative 
(zhudong主動權) can only be obtained through preemptive and offensive actions in an 
information operations at sea.22 
 
3. Emphasis of Jointness 
The PLA Navy recognizes local war under informationized conditions can no longer rely 
on a single service, but joint operations. Modern naval operations has to combine 
information, platforms, intelligence, communications, firepower, logistics and to be 
                                                      
19
 “PLA Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng on Naval Development Strategy,” Hong Kong Zijing Monthly, August, 
2001. See http://www.zijing.com.cn/200108/GB/08-02.htm 
20
 Liu Shengru, Liu Zheng and Wang Lei, “Innovation and Development of Naval Operations Doctrine under 
Informationized Conditions” (xinxihua tiaojianxia haijun zuozhan lilun de chuangxin yu fazhan), Journal of 
National Defense Univeraity, No. 11 (General No. 183), 2004, p.44. 
21
 Quan Jinfu, “Innovative Development of Our Naval Strategic Theory in the New Century” (xinshiji woguo 
haijun zhanlue lilun de chuangxin fazhan), Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics, No. 3, Vol. 20, 2004, pp. 
82-83. 
22
 Wang Zheng, “Some Issues Concerning Information Operations in the Joint Naval Campaign” (haishang 
lianhe zhanyi xinxi zuozhan de jige wenti), Journal of National Defense University, No. 10 (General No. 182), 
2004, p. 44. 
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conducted in the form of integrated joint operations.23 Establishing an “information 
operations coordination and command center for joint campaign at sea” (haishang lianhe 
zhanyi xinxi zuozhan xietiao yu zhihui zhongxin海上聯合戰役信息作戰協調與指揮
中心) and numerous related recommendation had been put forth for fighting a better 
coordinated local war at sea.24 
 
4. Expanded Area of Responsibilities 
The PLA Navy considers the threats to China’s maritime interests have been much 
greater in the new century, including maritime territorial disputes and demarcations, 
piracy and terrorist activities at sea, security of sea lanes of communication and energy 
transportation.25 China has been reported to contemplate a “string of pearls” strategy, 
securing cooperation and gaining access to locations from Pakistan to Bangladesh, 
Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, along the energy sea lanes of communication for East 
Asian countries.26 Regardless of the reliability of such report, the PLA Navy would sail 
beyond the area of responsibility defined by Admiral Liu Huaqing, and the “offshore” 
concept will be re-conceptualized. 
 
5. Strive for Access Denial  
When the PLA Navy’s “offshore active defense strategy” was first introduced, the depth 
of defense at sea was expanded from China’s coastal waters to the first island chain. In 
the past decade, as China’s fear of Taiwan moving toward de jure independence 
increased and the U.S.-Japan alliance consolidated, discussions in the PLA Navy over 
building up anti-access and area denial capabilities began to surface. Many had argued 
that China should increase long-range precision strike capability to dissuade possible 
third-party intervention in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and deny access of enemy 
force from force projection against China.27 
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6. Robust Modernization Programs 
The PLA Navy since the early 1990s, has engaged in very robust modernization 
programs: building large tonnage surface combatants equipped with modern sensors and 
weapons systems at very impressive speed, expanding the submarine fleet with better 
warfighting capabilities, improving anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense 
capabilities, acquiring aero-refueling and expanded undersea replenishment 
capabilities.28 All these increased assets and capabilities have enabled strategists and 
war planners to further develop new  
Observations and Reflections 
 
 The PLA is not at the frontline 
Regarding the escalated tensions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the 
deputy director of the contingency office in the PLA’s General Staff Department publically 
stated that "China is opposed to the use or threat of use of force." Responded to the press 
inquiry in the same Ministry of Defense press conference on whether China is ready to 
launch a war in the South China Sea, Spokesman Geng Yansheng also stated that the core 
issue of the South China Sea issue involves sovereignty disputes over the Spratly Islands and 
demarcation of maritime rights, and these issues should be resolved through bilateral 
negotiations between the parties concerned. Geng said "China is willing to work with 
ASEAN to develop friendly and cooperative relations, including defense and security, jointly 
promote regional peace, stability and prosperity; and at the same time, the Chinese military is 
opposed to any military intervention in the region."29 
 
 PLA on Scarborough 
When the Scarborough Shoal dispute irrupted, Chinese Defense Minister Liang 
Guanglie was In his “research tour” in the two provinces that border the South China Sea, 
Guangdong and Guangxi, from April 6 to 16. In a speech, he said: “Use the military with 
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carefulness, gauge the situation when using the military, and use the military according to the 
law.” These, and other statements hinting at the use of military, may have caused the situation 
in the South China Sea to intensify.30 
PLA’s preference of diplomatic solution could be seen when Gen. Liang Guanglie met 
with his Philippine counterpart Voltaire Gazmin on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting in Cambodia, a time when the disputes persisted in the South China Sea. 
Liang said the Philippines is a important neighbor of China and his country has made great 
efforts to improve the relationship between the two. Liang pointed out that Huangyan 
(Scarborough) Island is an inherent part of China’s territory. He ask the Philippines to resist 
from escalating the issue. Gazmin suggested that the two sides continue to open lines of 
communication and look for a peaceful solution.31 
 
 PLA on Diaoyutai 
When meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on September 18, 2012, 
Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie finally spoke up the PLA’s position on the 
Diaoyutai dispute lingering from April. He blamed that Japan intention to “nationalize” the 
Diaoyutai Islands and heated up the dispute and China “firmly oppose the U.S. position that 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyutai Islands.”32 
 
 Does the PLA eager to fight? 
Chi Le-yi, a veteran PLA watcher and senior report of the China Times made an 
interesting observation on China’s dilemma in handling the Scarborough standoff, arguing that 
China would become “paper tiger” if a use of force cannot bring about victory over the much 
weaker Philippines. He disagreed with many who argue that China was waiting for the 
Philippines to fire the first shot, instead China was exactly afraid of that first shot and being 
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forced to take a military option. He argued, a stalemate in a possible military conflict over the 
Scarborough would not only break the myth of “PLA is invincible” as Chinese propaganda 
claimed, but also undermined the reputation of the Communist Party.33 
 
 Practical thoughts 
In an interview with the Modern Ship (現代艦船 xian dai jian chuan), former chief of 
the PLA Navy’s equipment and technology department Rear Admiral Zhneg Ming (鄭明) 
raised five critical questions China needs to conduct further studies.34 They are: 
1. Should China deploy troops on those vital and strategically important, but 
uninhabited islets and shoals? 
2. Should China build up production and logistic base on the Spratly Islands to support 
fishing and maritime scientific research activities? 
3. How to maintain regular patrols of PLA Navy and maritime surveillance and law 
enforcement ships in the South China Sea. 
4. How to find solutions or create a fait accompli against the piecemeal annexation by 
other claimants of South China Sea islands? 
5. Should diplomatic measures and negotiations be always the first priority in dealing 
with future maritime disputes? 
 
 PLA-Civilian agencies collaboration 
Analyzing China’s management of maritime sovereignty disputes can bring about more 
observations on civil-military relations – between the PLA and the non-military maritime 
affairs agencies. Though the PLA may not take the front seat, but it definitely maintains a 
close operational relationship with its civilian partners. 
1. PLA is the ultimate guarantor for civilian maritime operations at sea, as a deterrent 
and as the back-up forces. 
2. PLA can provide logistic support for civilian agencies, from ship transfer, 
professional education and training, to materials and munitions. 
3. Civilian agencies can be advocate for PLA modernization, as we witnessed 20 years 
ago that the State Oceanic Administration has always voiced support of aircraft 
carrier building 
 
 Strategic Calculus: East is different from the South 
Although both Diaoyutai and Huangyan (Scarborough) islands are involved with same 
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issue of maritime territorial claims, there strategic implications are far from the same. The 
Huangyan Island might be kept at the level of sovereignty claims or even less at th level of 
fishing disputes; the Diaoyutai however touches the boundary of the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance, and may directly lead to military conflict between the world’s two largest economies 
and two nuclear powers.  
 
### 
 
 
